In a vertical product differentiation model under Cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long-run quality for a quantity restriction at, and in the neighborhood of, the free trade import level. Average quality increases only when the low-quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota / voluntary export restraint. The change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota. The imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long-run choice of quality.
Introduction
The issue of quality choice under the imposition of quantity restrictions (QR) has received considerable attention in international trade policy. Theoretical models of quality choice can be classified into two categories, sequential and simultaneous. In sequential choice models firms invest in quality before they compete in the market in prices or quantities. Quality costs are thus sunk in the market competition stage. In this sense investment in quality is considered a long-run variable in these models. These models have received much attention in papers by Thisse, 1980, 1986; Shaked and Sutton, 1982 , 1983 , 1984 Sutton (1992) ; Motta (1993) among others. In contrast, in simultaneous choice models quality choice is a short-run variable (as referred to by Feenstra, 1988) in the sense that quality costs are borne during the market competition stage. Thus, the two approaches suggest quite distinct testable implications for empirical 1 studies.
Results from empirical studies tend towards significant quality improvements in the year immediately following the imposition of the quantity restriction. Feenstra (1988) finds evidence of quality upgrading for cars with ambiguous change in quality for trucks. Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) show quality upgrading for the steel industry in the year immediately after the imposition of the quota, while Aw and Roberts (1986) find evidence of quality upgrading for shoe imports to the US. None of these papers study the effects of imposing a quantity restriction on long-run investment in quality by a firm.
Most of the theoretical models of quality choice in the international trade 2, 3 literature fall into the category of simultaneous choice models. These models predict quality upgrading under perfect competition. For the case of a foreign monopolist selling in the home market Krishna (1987) finds an increase in the quality of the imports due to the imposition of an import quota whenever consumers with a higher valuation of the good are willing to pay more for the higher quality, i.e., P , 0 (P(x, q) is the inverse demand curve, x is output and q xq is quality). A restrictive quota removes marginal consumers from the market and the monopolist, who only cares about the marginal consumer, has an incentive to upgrade its quality. Otherwise, quality is downgraded. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) study an oligopoly where firms decide simultaneously on output and quality. In their model, while imposing a quota at the free trade level does not change thé quality of the domestic or the foreign firm, QRs strictly below (the free trade level of imports) always increase the quality of the imported good. The domestic firm also upgrades its quality, but only if the foreign firm is the high-quality producer; 1 We are not referring to the case where a firm produces different models and is able to substitute inputs across models due to change in market conditions (this possibility is referred to by Feenstra, 1988) . None of the theoretical models mentioned above captures such a scenario.
2 See Falvey (1979) ; Santoni and Van Cott (1980) ; Das and Donnenfeld (1987) , (1989) (among others). For a summary of results on perfect competition and monopoly, and for a very good selective survey on export restraints with imperfect competition see Krishna (1990) .
3 For a monopolist the simultaneous or sequential choice models are equivalent. We would like to thank Simon Anderson for pointing this out to us. otherwise it downgrades. The intuition is similar to the monopoly case. Restricted by the quota, the foreign firm extracts a higher surplus from the high-valuation consumers by upgrading its quality. Ries (1993) extends this result to the case of a multiproduct oligopoly. In Donnenfeld (1987), (1989) and Ries, however, quality choice is a short-run variable. Simultaneity in the choice of quality and output removes the ability of a firm to manipulate its rival's quantity by 4 committing to a level of quality.
In this paper we study the effect of QR's on endogenous quality choice when 5 quality is a long-run strategic variable. A vertical product differentiation model, with a foreign and a domestic firm, is analyzed for the case of imposition of QR's such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VER), or import quotas. The government first commits to an import quota, or equivalently the foreign country commits to a VER. Then firms simultaneously choose their qualities bearing quality costs at this stage. In the following stage they compete in quantities in the domestic market. We show that both the foreign and the domestic firms downgrade their qualities for a QR imposed at the free trade level of imports. This contrasts with Donnenfeld (1989), (1989) , who show that the quota only has an impact on quality if it is strictly less than the free trade level of imports. Further, downgrading is also observed for quotas greater than or less than the free trade level of imports. This is important because even an ex ante non-restrictive level of QR has strategic effects. A high-or low-quality foreign firm always downgrades its quality in response to any import restriction. When the domestic firm is low quality it downgrades (its quality) for restrictions close enough to the free trade level; however, it upgrades its quality only for a sufficiently binding QR. Further, if the domestic firm is of high quality then it always downgrades for any level of import restriction.
If quality is chosen prior to the quantity competition stage firms have an incentive to lower qualities in the presence of QR's. A direct consequence of this is that we get higher prices, lower qualities, higher profits, and lower domestic welfare for a quantity restriction imposed not just at free trade, but also above the free trade level of imports.
The paper is structured as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we look at the effect on qualities, firm profits and domestic welfare of ex ante non-restrictive Quantity Restraints. Section 4 analyzes the effects of ex ante binding quotas / VERs. Section 5 shows that quality downgrading for a quota at the free trade level of imports holds in a more general model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The basic model
We consider the simple case of two countries, foreign and domestic. There are two firms, one located in each country producing a vertically differentiated good and selling in the domestic market. High quality is indexed as s and low quality 1 as s , with s . s . We concentrate on the effects of quantity restrictions in the 2 1 2 domestic market alone. There is a continuum of consumers in the domestic market, each is identified by his taste parameter u, where u is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,Q] with density 1; Qthen represents the size of the market. A consumer u has unit demand for the good and his utility function is:
us 2 p if he buys one unit of the good of quality s at a price p. U 5
(1) 0 otherwise.
2
Total costs are, C(s ,x )5s /2, i51,2. The marginal cost of production is
independent of the quality level and quality costs are fixed. Without loss of generality we assume that marginal cost, 0. This specification of costs captures the distinctive characteristics of (pure) vertical differentiation models. Shaked and Sutton (1983) define a pure vertically differentiated industry as one where the costs of quality improvement fall primarily on fixed costs and involve only a 6 modest, or no, increase in unit variable costs. Quality costs that are borne in the first stage are treated as being sunk in the production stage (see Sutton, 1992) . The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the government credibly commits to a specific quantity restriction. Equivalently, the domestic government imposes an import quota on the foreign firm, or the foreign government chooses a VER on its own firm. After the government's announcement of the QR, the firms simul-2 taneously choose their qualities, bearing quality costs, s /2, i51,2. The game is i solved using sub-game perfection.
To derive the demands for the high-and low-quality good, we define the taste parameter of the consumer indifferent between buying the high-or low-quality good as u 5( p 2p )/(s 2s ); and that of the consumer indifferent between all. Then: and the inverse demands are:
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
Note that the cross derivative of the inverse demand with respect to own quality and own quantity is negative. (This is the condition under which Krishna, 1987 gets quality upgrading for the case of a foreign monopoly.) To analyze the effects of quantity restrictions we first study quality choice under free trade. Following Motta (1993) , for any given pair of qualities (s ,s ) firm i 1 2 chooses its quantity to maximize its (gross) profits, p (x ,x )x , given the quantity
of its rival x . The reaction functions are: Solving we get the equilibrium quantities, in order to steal business from its rival in the second stage. Due to this business-stealing effect, both firms choose higher qualities than if quality and quantity were chosen simultaneously. In other words, whenever quality is a long-run strategic variable whose costs are sunk, a firm has incentives to commit to a higher quality in order to increase its market share and profits in the market competition stage. This strategic incentive is absent whenever quality is a shortrun variable, and thus free trade equilibrium qualities are lower under the short-run scenario.
In the first stage, taking the quality of its rival s as given firm i chooses its TW (TW ) is the total domestic welfare when the domestic firm produces the fl fh low-(high-) quality good.
The effect of ex ante non-restrictive quantity restraints
We first analyze the effect on the quality configuration of a quota / VER imposed at, or even slightly above, the free trade level of imports. In Das and Donnenfeld (1989) a quantity restraint at the free trade level of imports has no effect on the quality configuration. As firms choose their qualities and quantities simultaneously, a quota imposed at (or, above) the free trade level of imports is not ex post binding. In this case the domestic and the foreign firm select the same qualities as under free trade. Yet, as we will show below, if firms first choose their qualities and then compete in quantities, ex ante non-restrictive quotas do have an effect on 9 the quality configuration. In fact, both the domestic and the foreign firm downgrade their qualities in the presence of the quota, regardless of whether the foreign firm produces the high-or the low-quality good.
The intuition is rather simple. Let the quota be imposed at the free trade level of imports. As the foreign firm's sales are already restricted by the quota, the domestic firm's incentive to strategically increase its quality in order to reduce its rival's sales is not present anymore. The domestic firm then selects a lower quality than under free trade and thus saves on quality costs. As a result, if the foreign firm is of high (low) quality, the quality gap increases (decreases). Therefore, in order to relax market competition a low-quality foreign firm will also downgrade its quality, maintaining its sales and saving on quality costs. On the other hand, a high-quality foreign firm also downgrades and saves on quality costs while maintaining its sales. Larger quality differentiation thus results in softer market competition. As the quantitative restraint removes some of the strategic effects, it relaxes overall competition and leads to higher prices and profits for the firms. As in Krishna (1989) , ex ante nonrestrictive quotas / VERs act as collusion facilitating devices.
Let a quota / VER imposed on the foreign firm be equal, or slightly higher, than 10 the free trade level of imports. The following proposition summarizes the results:
8 Total domestic welfare is defined here as the (unweighted) sum of consumer surplus and domestic firm's profits. 9 A qualitatively similar result has been obtained in other contexts. In Krishna (1987) an ex-ante nonrestrictive quota has an affect on the prices chosen by the domestic and the foreign firm. In Reitzes (1991) , a nonrestrictive quota alters the decisions on R&D expenditures of the firms.
10 See Herguera et al. (1997) for the exact interval of quotas. restricted by the quota in the quantity competition stage; that is, the foreign firm 11 would have increased its quantity, if the QR were not present. Thus, an ex ante non-restrictive quota becomes ex post restrictive for the foreign firm. Fig. 1 provides further intuition for our quality downgrading result. Suppose that the foreign firm is high quality and the quota is imposed at the free trade level * of imports (Q 5x ). As the reaction function of the domestic firm, R (x ), is H 1 2 1 independent of qualities, the effect on quality choice of a QR is explained by looking solely at its effect on the reaction function of the foreign firm. The latter now becomes kinked at the level of the quota (Q Q ). The domestic firm can then H H 9 decrease its quality [shifting R (x ) outwards to R (x )] and save on quality costs, 1 2 1 2 while maintaining its sales. As quality costs are quadratic, while revenues are linear in quality, domestic firm's profits increase. Meanwhile, the foreign firm also 9 lowers its quality (moving R (x ) inwards), maintaining its sales, and thus 1 2 increasing its profits. Similarly, when the foreign firm is the low-quality producer (firm 2) the imposition of a quota at the free trade level makes its reaction function kinked at * 99 Q 5x (Fig. 1) . For the same decrease in its quality [that shifts R (x ) to R (x )] L 2 1 2 1 2 the domestic firm now loses a smaller amount of sales (Q B) than it would have H under free trade (Q C). Hence, it has an incentive to lower its quality and save on H quality costs. Meanwhile, the foreign firm also saves on quality costs by lowering 12 9 its quality (R (x ) shifts outwards) and maintaining its sales. maximum restrictive QR average quality is 0.184Q (0.188Q ) when the foreign firm is high (low) quality, which is lower than under free trade. Further, both firms 13 earn higher profits than under free trade. As the quota restricts the foreign firm's sales ex post, the domestic firm acting as a monopolist on the residual demand chooses its (monopoly) profit maximizing quality. Since the domestic firm's strategic incentive to increase its quality in order to reduce its rival's output is now absent, competition in the quality stage becomes softer. Thus, the foreign firm attains a higher level of profits by lowering its quality. In this sense, QR's facilitate collusion between the foreign and the Finally, total domestic welfare under an ex-ante non-restrictive QR is always lower than under free trade. This is true regardless of the quality produced by the foreign firm. A domestic government has no incentive to impose an ex-ante non-restrictive quota on the foreign firm as the decrease in the consumer surplus outweighs the increase in the home firm's profits. However, as we will see in the next section, the domestic government may sometimes opt for an ex-ante restrictive quota. In fact if the foreign firm is low quality the domestic government prefers to totally ban imports. Otherwise, home governments' welfare is maximized under free trade. In contrast, the foreign government prefers to impose a VER on its own firm, since the foreign firm's profits are now higher than under free trade. In fact, as foreign firm's profits increase with the quota, the optimal VER is the maximum QR that becomes ex post restrictive on the foreign firm.
Ex ante restrictive quotas / VERs
Suppose that a quota strictly less than the free trade level of imports is imposed on the foreign firm. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) show that the foreign firm always upgrades its quality after the imposition of an ex ante restrictive QR. The domestic firm also upgrades its quality but only if it produces the low-quality good; otherwise, it responds to the quota by downgrading its quality. This result is due to the specification of their model. It can be checked that in our (pure) vertical differentiation specification under simultaneous choice of qualities and quantities, the foreign firm (regardless of its quality) responds to a QR by lowering its 15 16 quality, on the contrary, the domestic firm upgrades its quality. Yet, a quota arbitrarily close to the free trade level results in an infinitesimal decrease of the quality of imports when the choice of qualities and quantities is simultaneous, while in a substantial (higher order) decrease if this choice is sequential. Furthermore, we show in the next section that the quality downgrading result even holds under the Das and Donnenfeld (1987) , (1989) specification whenever quality is a long-run variable.
14 Note, when firms compete a la Cournot, the imposition of a quota at the free trade level has no influence on the profits of the firms in a simultaneous quality-output choice model. In our case, the imposition of the quantity restriction at the free trade level affects firm profits because market competition is relaxed as firms commit to specific levels of quality. 15 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 16 In fact, if the selection of qualities and quantities is simultaneous, then the free trade equilibrium increase in the domestic firm's quality as the quota becomes restrictive, increase in domestic output and restricted sales of the low-quality good. Proposition 2(a) summarizes the results.
Proposition 2(a). Import quality deteriorates as the QR becomes more restrictive. In contrast, there is an improvement in quality of the domestic good. As the quota becomes more restrictive, total output decreases, while average quality increases (decreases) if the foreign firm is of low (high) quality. Average quality is lower than under free trade, except if the quota is sufficiently restrictive and the foreign firm is of low quality.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a quota / VER becomes restrictive the profits of the foreign firm decrease, while those of the home firm increase. The foreign government thus never opts for a VER strictly less than the free trade level of imports.
If the foreign firm is of high quality, the domestic government prefers free trade over any level of QR. The increase in the home firm's profits is not enough to compensate for the consumer welfare loss (both average quality and total output decrease). Total welfare is higher under free trade than under any level of quota. If the foreign firm is of low-quality consumer welfare loss is of a lower magnitude (as average quality increases) and is compensated by the increase in home firm's 17 We restrict attention to quantity restrictions such that neither of the firms has an incentive to leapfrog its rival. That is, the condition that a high (low) quality firm would not choose to produce the low (high) quality good is always satisfied. This defines the lower limit for Q . For the proof, that no H firm has incentive to leapfrog its rival for Q >0.252Q see Herguera et al. (1994) . In a related paper H (Herguera et al., 1996) we analyze the implications on quality choice of very restrictive import quotas / VERs.
18 It can be checked that no firm has incentive to leapfrog its rival for all Q <0.275Q. For the proof L see Herguera et al. (1994) . 19 Note that the domestic firm quality never exceeds the free trade level of quality. Proof. See Appendix A.
A more general model
In this section we generalize the model presented in Section 2. The generalization refers to the specification of the domestic market and the cost functions. There is a continuum of consumers, each consuming a unit (or none) of the good and having utility: u . The total mass of consumers equals m. In general, firms employ different technologies. Firm i producing output y and quality s has total costs C ( y ,s ),
where ≠C / ≠y ;MC .0, ≠C / ≠s ;MQC .0, ≠MC / ≠y >0 and ≠MQC / ≠s .0.
In the spirit of a pure vertical differentiation model where marginal cost changes i only slightly with the quality level we assume that ≠MC / ≠s is small enough. The i bulk of quality improvement costs thus fall upon the fixed costs of production (see 1 Sutton, 1992 for a nice graphical description). Finally, assume that C (.,s )< 1 20 If the density function is log-concave then the hazard rate is increasing. 21 This is a commonly made assumption in the literature (see, for example, Tirole (1989), p. 156) . It is satisfied by many distributions, like the normal, the exponential, the uniform, the logistic, the Pareto, and any distribution with nondecreasing density. 2 C (.,s ) for all s 5s . That is, the firm that produces the high quality is at least as 2 1 2 efficient as the firm that produces the low quality. Define u(x) such that 12F(u(x))5x; then du(x)/dx52[1 /f(u(x))]. Let u 12 denote the consumer who is indifferent between buying the high-, or the low-, quality good. Further, let u be the consumer who is indifferent between buying 02 the low-quality good or not buying at all. Let p be the price for quality s . Then, x ) and the inverse demands are: 
where, p ;≠p / ≠x , u (x 1x );≠u(x 1x )/≠x etc. Eq. (8) defines firm 1's
best response function, BR (x ,s ,s ), while Eq. (7) defines firm 2's, BR (x ,s ).
Note that, BR does not depend on s , the quality level of the high-quality firm.
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The solution to Eqs. (7) and (8) (since by the envelope theorem p 50). The first term in Eq. (9) is the direct xi effect of an increase in firm i's quality on its own profits. The last term is the strategic effect, i.e., an increase in firm i's quality leads to a reduction in its rival's * output (≠x / ≠s ,0), and thus an increase in firm i's profits, since: 
*
This is true as BR does not depend on s . Now, dp / ds evaluated at s 5s is 2 1 1 1 1 negative. Once more the quota removes the strategic effect and the foreign firm * also downgrades its quality, i.e. s ,s . 
* *
Thus, dp /ds evaluated at s 5s is negative and hence s ,s . The quota Finally, note that the above reasoning can be extended in the case of a quota imposed slightly above, or below, the free trade level of imports.
Conclusions
Our paper is different from those of our predecessors in the sense that predictions of our model are towards long-run investment in quality. As quality choice is a long-run strategic variable, a firm pre-commits to a quality level before it competes in the market (incurring a sunk cost of improving its quality at an earlier stage). Our results indicate that the imposition of a quantity restriction at, or in the neighborhood of, the free trade level of imports results in lower long-run investment in quality. Only for the case where a very restrictive QR is imposed on the low-quality foreign firm is average quality higher than under free trade. Further, we get quality downgrading even under the condition for which the foreign monopolist in Krishna (1987) upgrades its quality, i.e., if P ,0 (P(x,q) is xq the inverse demand curve, x is output and, q is the quality). Also, in contrast to Donnenfeld (1987), (1989) , where for a restriction at the free trade level no changes in quality are observed, we get quality downgrading.
Our results highlight the importance of strategic interaction for the choice of quality and the role of the timing of the decisions. In our sequential framework firms first compete in qualities and then in quantities. For a QR imposed on the foreign firm at, or close to, the free trade level the home firm (acting as a monopolist on the residual demand) is able to decrease its quality and thus save on the sunk costs of quality, while barely losing any sales. Similarly, the foreign firm also lowers its quality, maintaining its market share, and increases its profit by (also) saving on the costs of quality.
In a structure similar to ours Lutz (1997) has shown that under price competition a quota always leads to downgrading of the high-quality firm regardless of on whom the quota is imposed while, the low-quality firm always upgrades its quality. Thus, price competition does not lead to a complete reversal of our results.
That quantity restrictions work as facilitating practices (as in Harris, 1985; Krishna, 1989 ) is further reinforced in our framework. After the imposition of the restriction at (or in the neighborhood of) the free trade level both firms lower qualities, raise prices, and attain higher profits. Our analogue of the result is even more striking because quotas work as a facilitating practice device for the case of competition in quantities. This is contrary to the well known result that QR's have no influence on market outcomes when firms compete in quantities. In fact the foreign firm opts for a maximum ex ante nonrestrictive quota as its profits are the highest. While the domestic firm prefers free trade if imports are of high quality and opts for banning them if they are low quality. There are several interesting lines of research that further need to be investigated. We are already analyzing how governments can strategically use policies to provoke leapfrogging to maximize domestic welfare. that dp /dQ ,0 and dp /dQ . 
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3. First, BRs are downwards slopping, since from Eqs. (7) i 2 i
